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Coaliton Warfare: Strengths and Weaknesses

Good setup, flawed deliveryThe book's biggest flaw is its heavy dependence on the scholarship of other historians. It covers too broad of a time period, and as a result, Bailey and Green the criminologists are forced to rely on historians for any infomation. They quote other historians almost verbatum in early chapters. This detracts from their overall work, because they rely on other historians to deliver their own message. Anything before 1900 is exceptionally weak.
The author's arguments for twentieth century are strong, however. Here, I believe their criminology background serves them well, and gives a different perspective than one would get from a historian or sociologist, for example. The authors deserve credit for trying to fit events like Attica, Rodney King, and O.J. Simpson into a larger framework. These are events too recent for even modern historians to touch, and Bailey and Green handle them well.
I can't fully recommend this book because of the mentioned flaws, but it might be worthwhile just for the authors' analysis of recent events. I'd recommend Harvard historian Randall Kennedy's "Race, Crime, and Law" over this book.


A good overview of Scottish cuisine

Following the Map

Play with PetulaThe story is told in a way that almost demands to be read aloud, the language is rhythmic, filled with vivid descripitions and dialogue that evokes the setting and experiences of the characters. "It's time now to dance. I'm wearing my silver and green dancing pants. I can float like a cloud. I'm as light as the air. When I jump over here, I land way over there. I can hang upside down by my toes from this tree. So I just don't have time for a bath. Can't you see?"
At some point, the reader becomes lost in the game, lost in the world of the story, where Petula has vegetables growing out of her hair and greedy neighbours literally snapping at her heels! This book offers a humorous look at the 'dirty side' of life, which most young children would giggle themselves grotty at. Let's face it, where there is a child, there is usually grot... (and I mean that in the nicest possible way!)


This book omits Marie Curie, one of the greatest!

Good, but needs proofreadingA good essay to read on "Publishers and Publishing" is by C. Michael Curtis, Senior Editor of The Atlantic Monthly, where for the past twenty years or so he been [sic] largely responsible for almost of [sic] the fiction the magazine has published.
Others include, but are not limited to:
p. 39 cush instead of such
p. 65 hallowing instead of hollowing
p. 68 intellecutally [sic];afterall [sic]
p. 83 packets instead of pockets
Apart from these errors, the book has much for the beginning writer, which I still am after 12 years of writing short stories. The first few sections on Significant Detail, Character, Point of View and Power of the Plot were all very strong, even if not entirely new to me. However, despite Tom Bailey's many admirable touches (you can tell he is a gifted writing teacher from his unstinting generosity and profusion of examples), the glut of the material seems to have come from other sources, notably Gardner's 'Art of Fiction', Raymond Carver's 'Fires', and Flannery O'Connor's 'Writing Short Stories'.
The book's main strength is that it has introduced me to a much wider variety of writers, and given me enough ideas for the mother of all wish lists. Lastly, Tom Bailey's story at the end, 'Snow Dreams', went a long way in making me forget the score of pesky but debilitating errors on many of the other pages.


Interesting Subject, Disorganized Presentation

mediocreThat said, for its price and the time it takes to read it and occasionally refer back to it, it probably is a worthwhile purchase for a dog owner or prospective dog owner, even if it is somewhat lacking.


The Need For Accountability
Article 118 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 1949 states that POWs shall
BE RELEASED AND REPATRIATED WITHOUT DELAY AFTER CESSATION OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES.
It was this position that suggested to some, such as Turner Joy, chief US negotiator the the talks, that the repatriation issue should not be on the agenda at the truce talks since a truce was exclusively an agreement to stop the fighting. Repatriation occurred after, not during, truce discussions. However, quoting from a British Gov't White Paper analyzing article 118, Bailey continues...
"THE LANGUAGE CANNOT MEAN MORE THAN IT ACTUALLY SAYS. THE TERM USED IS 'RELEASED AND REPATRIATED' AND THIS DOES NOT MEAN FORCIBLY REPATRIATED, WHICH WOULD BE FOREIGN TO THE WHOLE SPIRIT OF THE CONVENTION. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE POW CONVENTION HAD BEEN ADOPTED...."
considered this possibility. But they felt it could only be a rare occurence. The Convention was intended to help POWs and ...
AS LONG AS OBJECTION TO REPATRIATION WAS GENUINE, THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM COULD BE HELD TO PREVAIL OVER THE NORMAL OBLIGATION TO REPATRIATE. "
Sorry for the legalese but Bailey's book is a good attempt to make clear the basis for the UN/US stand on refusing to repatriate unwilling Chinese and NKPA forces. Bailey suggests that in a conflict of rights--repatriation vs. asylum-- the latter is controlling.
Nonetheless it does not address Joy's primary objection: the purpose of the truce is just to stop the fighting No matter how uncomfortable or uncertain the post truce outcome on the POW issue might be, it had no business on the agenda as an item. The language in Article 118 is quite clear that repatriation--of ANY KIND-- does not occur until the hostilities have stopped. In short we put the cart before the horse. In the endless months the negotiations bogged down on this issue, countless casualties and deaths resulted. In a war with far more than its share of tragedies and arrogance on the part of both sides, this was perhaps the greatest.
While many people will read this book and use it as an analysis of the pros and cons of coalition warfare/coalition diplomacy, it is somewhat less than that. Before a country or an alliance can begin negotiations, it must have clearly stated objectives and a clear sense of what it feels is worth fighting for and what it feels is worth negotiating away. Thus in Desert Storm a military decision was reached not to go all the way to Baghdad, and we stuck to it. The Korean War, in contrast, is an example of pragmatism run amok: Truman discards years of JCS analysis that 'Korea isn't strategically important to the US.' Along the way he tramples congress' exclusive right to declare war. Acheson abandons his own claim six months before that 'Korea is outside the US Sphere of influence.' MacArthur says the NKPA will run from the sight of Americans, then suddenly he needs every soldier in the Far East. First we won't cross the parallel..then its up to the UN, then its up to MacArthur, then we're in deep doo-doo (as a latter day pragmatist president might say, in his own little undeclared venture) 200 miles inside enemy territory.
I remember once hearing a Korean War vet say he left to ragtime and came home to rock'n roll. Of course the real tragedy is that 35,000 never came home at all. Within a decade another war, again undeclared, ultimately to claim 56,000. The real danger of coalition warfare, and fighting under the UN umbrella, is that it provides the Chief Executive with political cover so he can avoid seeking congressional approval. Dangerous...very very dangerous. Those who distrust coalition warfare and placing US forces under a UN flag are not neo-isolationist radicals. They simply ask that a President who feels the blood of American men (and women) is worth the dignity of a Congressional Declaration of War.